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FIAT LUX: TRACING A STANDARD OF REVIEW 
FOR CLASS-CERTIFICATION ORDERS 
Curtis E.A. Karnow* 
And you may ask yourself
Well . . . How did I get here?**
I. INTRODUCTION: RULES AND REASONS
Trial judges are comforted by the usual standard of review, 
which is—in plain English—that their decisions are assumed to 
be right, if only in the sense that the appellant usually has the 
burden of showing otherwise. Doctrines of harmless error and 
others tend to focus on the result below and, if the record 
supports the result, urge affirmance. The record might be barren, 
it might reveal a trial judge’s incorrect rationale, but if the result 
is otherwise supportable, the trial judge is usually affirmed.1
*Judge of the California Superior Court, County of San Francisco.
**Talking Heads, Once in a Lifetime, on Remain in Light (Sire Records 1980).
1. E.g., JON B. EISENBERG ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: CIVIL APPEALS AND 
WRITS ¶ 8:15 (noting that “[t]he most fundamental rule of appellate review is that an 





      05/10/2017   10:58:23
39109 aap_17-2 Sheet No. 24 Side B      05/10/2017   10:58:23
KARNOWRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/3/2017 1:32 AM
218 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
But there are a few situations in which appellate courts 
focus on the reasons provided and will reverse if the reasons do 
not support the result or the reasoning is wrong—even if the 
result has support in the record. I came across this in California 
state law, as I was having a look at the standards of review of 
decisions to certify (or not to certify) class actions. This is the 
class-certification standard, distinguished from the usual rule:
Under ordinary appellate review, we do not address the trial 
court’s reasoning and consider only whether the result was 
correct. . . . But when denying class certification, the trial 
court must state its reasons, and we must review those 
reasons for correctness. . . . We may only consider the 
reasons stated by the trial court and must ignore any 
unexpressed reason that might support the ruling.2
We might call this the Rule of Stated Reasons.3 It will be the 
focus of this article, but we begin by looking at two other rules 
from which the Rule of Stated Reasons must be differentiated.
A. Background: The Routine Rule
We must distinguish a different rule, which applies 
generally, including in the certification context: “A certification 
order generally will not be disturbed unless (1) it is unsupported 
by substantial evidence, (2) it rests on improper criteria, or (3) it 
rests on erroneous legal assumptions.”4 This rule is ordinary. It 
is routine to reverse if there is no factual support for a decision 
or the trial judge gets the law wrong. It is not this Routine Rule I
rule” as “affirmance on any correct ground” (emphasis in original)) (Nov. 2016)
[hereinafter PRACTICE GUIDE—CIVIL APPEALS].
2. Knapp v. AT & T Wireless Servs., Inc., 195 Cal. App. 4th 932, 939 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2011) (citations omitted; emphasis supplied).
3. See generally, e.g., PRACTICE GUIDE—CIVIL APPEALS, supra note 1, at
¶ 8:225 (noting that “the appellate court must examine the trial court’s reasons for the 
ruling”). This state rule does not appear to have a federal analogue. Compare, e.g.,
WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 7:53 (noting that standards of 
review for class actions “mirror ordinary standards of review”), § 14:19 (indicating that 
appellate courts “review trial courts’ class action decisions (certification, final approval, 
and fee approval) under ordinary appellate rules”) (Dec. 2016) [hereinafter NEWBERG];
Vallario v. Vandehey, 554 F.3d 1259, 1264 (10th Cir. 2009) (discussing appellate court’s 
approach to petitions for interlocutory review of trial court’s grant or denial of class 
certification).
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am interested in here, although as we will see later, some courts 
rely on the Routine Rule as if it necessarily justified the Rule of 
Stated Reasons. It does not, however, for one may have the 
former without the latter.
B. Background: The Rule of Intendments
There is a third rule of review, also seemingly routine, that 
we should also distinguish: “We must ‘[p]resum[e] in favor of 
the certification order . . . the existence of every fact the trial 
court could reasonably deduce from the record.’”5 This third 
rule is part of the broader and usual standard, which, if one 
enjoyed the sound of old fashioned words, one might call the 
Rule of Intendments.6 Under this broad rule, when the record is 
silent, the order is generally affirmed.7 In the certification 
context, the more general, broader Rule of Intendments is not 
effective. If nothing “illuminates the court’s thinking” on the 
reasons for the determination, the case is reversed and 
remanded.8 The Rule of Intendments does not apply.9
5. Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Super. Ct., 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1022 (Cal. 2012) (quoting Sav–
on Drug Stores, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 34 Cal. 4th 319, 329 (Cal. 2004) (ellipses in original)).
6. From a case almost a century ago: “In an appeal on the judgment-roll alone every 
intendment possible is in favor of the judgment or order appealed from, and if error does 
not affirmatively appear, it will be sustained, if there is any possible ground on which it can 
be sustained.” Myers v. Canepa, 37 Cal. App. 556, 560 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1918) (citation 
omitted). A newer case to the same effect is Seibert v. City of San Jose, 247 Cal. App. 4th 
1027, 1042 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (noting strong presumption that order entered below 
is correct). 
7. E.g., Elena S. v. Kroutik, 247 Cal. App. 4th 570, 574 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)
(indicating that a “judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct” and that “[a]ll
intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record 
is silent” (emphasis in original)); A.G. v. C.S., 246 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1281 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2016) (same).
8. Tellez v. Rich Voss Trucking, Inc., 240 Cal. App. 4th 1052, 1064 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
2015). The trial judge in Tellez found that a party failed to adhere to the court’s procedures 
to contest tentative rulings, and was thus barred from argument, which (and here is the 
error) in the judge’s view obviated the need to explain himself.  Id. at 1060, 1064 n.12.
9. See, for example, Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 522 (Cal. 
2014), in which only the concurring justice suggested that the Rule of Intendments applied.
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C. Our Primary Concern: The Rule of Stated Reasons
What then, is this narrower Rule of Stated Reasons that 
applies in the certification context? It is not clear; but it may just 
mean that when a judge does explain himself or herself in a way 
that suggests reliance on facts, the appellate court will indulge 
the trial court ruling if there is any basis in the record to do so.
I began by briefly outlining the various standards of review 
because the opinions that develop the Rule of Stated Reasons
ultimately dissolve into the distant mists of the past, sometimes 
doing so by conflating the Rule of Stated Reasons with these 
other standards of review.
The Rule of Stated Reasons is an oddity, and has been 
repeatedly called out as different from the usual approach.10
Why, then, did it develop? No one knows. This article provides
a guided tour to its genealogy, and shows that its origins are lost 
to us. It ends with some thoughts as to why, nevertheless, the 
Rule of Stated Reasons is as it is, and also considers its 
implications for the work of judges and lawyers.
II. TRACING THE RULE OF STATED REASONS
One might start almost anywhere in the last few years with 
a decision reviewing a certification or decertification order, and 
then trace the citations back through the ages, or through the 
decades anyway. Significantly, this is one of the few areas of 
law in which one sees only the citation or repetition of the rule,
never a discussion of its rationale. Despite frequently 
introducing the Rule of Stated Reasons as an exception to the 
usual standard of review, no court has felt an obligation to 
explain it. This both makes it relatively simple to trace the rule, 
10. E.g., Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp., 191 Cal. App. 3d 605, 611–12 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1987) (asserting that formulations like the Routine Rule, with their deference to lower 
courts, have “nothing to do with the standard of review” for certification orders in class 
actions because “[t]he right result is an inadequate substitute for an incorrect process” in 
that situation, and concluding that “appellate scrutiny should be on the reasons expressed 
by the trial court in the context of counsel’s arguments, not merely whether the trial court 
reached a result which can be justified by implication”); Caro v. Procter & Gamble Co., 18
Cal. App. 4th 644, 655–56 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (calling Rule of Stated Reasons an 
“exception to the general rule” (citation omitted)); Knapp, 195 Cal. App. 4th at 939 
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and leads to the ultimate frustration of never discovering at least 
an historical explanation for its development.
Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix walk the reader through 
scores of cases, starting with two recent cases and following
them back in what might be termed the main sequence. That 
work is checked, as shown in Table 3, by using a number of 
other recent cases as starting points to retrace the same steps. In
all of these tracings, we see that the citation chain usually 
touches down first on Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.11 and then, most 
significantly, proceeds through Linder to Clothesrigger, Inc. v. 
GTE Corp.12
For cases decided after 2000, Linder is probably the single 
most cited case in support of the Rule of Stated Reasons, with 
eight of the cases in what this article treats as the main sequence 
citing it directly. In a single paragraph, the California Supreme 
Court in Linder recites a series of standards that it means to 
apply, and explains their intended effect:
Because trial courts are ideally situated to evaluate the 
efficiencies and practicalities of permitting group action, 
they are afforded great discretion in granting or denying 
certification. The denial of certification to an entire class is 
an appealable order . . . , but in the absence of other error, a 
trial court ruling supported by substantial evidence 
generally will not be disturbed “unless (1) improper criteria 
were used . . .; or (2) erroneous legal assumptions were 
made . . . ” . . . . Under this standard, an order based upon 
improper criteria or incorrect assumptions calls for reversal 
“‘even though there may be substantial evidence to support 
the court’s order.’” . . . Accordingly, we must examine the 
trial court’s reasons for denying class certification. “Any 
valid pertinent reason stated will be sufficient to uphold the 
order.”13
From this statement, we must extract the rules. First, note 
the premise of deferral to the trial judge, especially because of 
the practical aspect of the certification order. The initial use of 
the word “because” suggests, accurately, that this reason 
11. 23 Cal. 4th 429, 435–36, 448 (Cal. 2000).
12. 191 Cal. App. 3d at 611–12. The Linder court cites both Caro and Clothesrigger in 
its discussion of this point, noting that Caro relies on Clothesrigger. Linder, 23 Cal. 4th at 
435–36.
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explains the rules that are about to be recited.14 Next, we see that 
the certification order is appealable; then we see the Routine 
Rule that looks to substantial evidence and a lack of legal 
error.15 But then Linder seems to say that the next rule recited—
our focus, the Rule of Stated Reasons—is either equivalent to 
the Routine Rule or is explained or justified by it.
We have already seen above that such an equivalence is 
false, and it is not at all obvious that the Routine Rule justifies or 
explains the Rule of Stated Reasons. Linder’s citation to 
Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc.16 gives it away: Richmond
only recites the Routine Rule, not the Rule of Stated Reasons, 
making it a dead end in the search for the origin of the latter.
Occidental Land, Inc. v. Superior Court17 and Fletcher v. 
Security Pacific National Bank,18 the cases on which Richmond
relies, are also dead ends. And we need not look far for cases in 
which the Routine Rule patently applies without any suggestion 
that a failure to state reasons is fatal: An appellate court might 
well insist on substantial evidence but still indulge the lower 
court with the Rule of Intendments.19 Indeed, the standard of 
review that insists on substantial evidence but nevertheless so 
indulges the trial court uses rules that are “natural and logical 
corollar[ies]” of each other; the tests actually go hand in hand.20
14. See infra § IV.
15. See text accompanying note 4, supra.
16. 29 Cal. 3d 462 (1981). The Richmond court’s discussion does not make reference to 
the Rule of Stated Reasons:
For example, in the absence of other error, this court will not disturb a trial court 
ruling on class certification which is supported by substantial evidence unless (1) 
improper criteria were used (see Occidental Land, Inc. v. Superior Court (1976) 
18 Cal.3d 355, 361 [134 Cal. Rptr. 388, 556 P.2d 750]); or (2) erroneous legal 
assumptions were made (Fletcher v. Security Pacific National Bank (1979) 23 
Cal.3d 442, 446 [153 Cal. Rptr. 28, 591 P.2d 51]).
Id. at 470.
17. See note 16, supra.
18. See note 16, supra.
19. See, e.g., A.G., 246 Cal. App. 4th at 1281 (quoting rule).
20. Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc., 245 Cal. App. 4th 227, 237 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)
(referring to “fundamental principles” of appellate review: presuming that judgment below 
is correct, indulging all “intendments and presumptions . . . in favor of correctness,” and 
requiring appellant to prove error); see also, e.g., Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. Maxim 
Integrated Prods., Inc., 236 Cal. App. 4th 243, 266 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (same); Apex 
LLC v. Korusfood.com, 222 Cal. App. 4th 1010, 1017 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (referring 
to “normal rules of appellate review”); Wallis v. PHL Assocs., Inc., 220 Cal. App. 4th 814, 
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At least as of Linder, then, we have no explanation for the quite 
distinct Rule of Stated Reasons.
So where can we turn after Linder? We follow its clues. It 
relies on Caro,21 which as Linder notes, relies on 
Clothesrigger,22 and National Solar.23 There is no more to say 
about National Solar, because it just relies on Richmond, a dead 
end, and on Clothesrigger.
We have come then to Clothesrigger, the 1987 decision 
directly relied on by not only Linder, but also four other cases in 
the main sequence, and many other cases as well. The decision 
in Clothesrigger is the decisive moment in the development of 
the Rule of Stated Reasons.
Clothesrigger discusses standards of review twice. The first 
time, it recites the Rule of Stated Reasons, analogizing to
non-statutory situations [that] involve issues where the 
appellate focus is on the means used by the trial court. The 
right result is an inadequate substitute for an incorrect 
process. Thus the appellate scrutiny should be on the 
reasons expressed by the trial court in the context of 
counsel’s arguments not merely whether the trial court 
reached a result which can be justified by implication.24
In this connection Clothesrigger has a single, lonely citation to a 
treatise on procedure.25 A few lines later, Clothesrigger recites a 
different standard: Richmond’s Routine Rule.26 And indeed the 
result in Clothesrigger probably stems from the application of 
this last standard, the Richmond rule, because the court first tries
to figure out what the trial judge probably meant and, second, 
criticizes what he did say.27 It does not appear that the trial 
judge’s result could have been rescued on appeal if only he had 
853, 882 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (using three-factor approach to judgment below: 
“presumed correct, all intendments and presumptions . . . indulged in its favor, and 
ambiguities . . . resolved in favor of affirmance” (citation omitted)).
21. 18 Cal. App. 4th at 655.
22. 191 Cal. App. 3d at 612.
23. Nat’l Solar Equip. Owners’ Assn. v. Grumman Corp., 235 Cal.App.3d 1273, 1281
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
24. Clothesrigger, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 611–12 (second emphasis supplied).
25. Id. at 611 (citing B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal § 262 (3d ed. 
1985)).
26. Id. at 612.
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stated his thinking correctly or more explicitly. If this is correct,
we have here the first of two wonderful twists: that the Rule of 
Stated Reasons—at least in the certification context—was born 
in a case to which it did not apply. But this is not shocking.28
We now turn to the second twist, and Clothesrigger’s novel 
articulation of the Rule of Stated Reasons. It is based on a
citation to the Witkin treatise, part of a respected series on both 
California procedural29 and substantive30 law that is frequently 
cited by California’s judges and lawyers as summarizing extant 
law.31 The pages cited in the 1987 Clothesrigger opinion are no 
longer generally available, but through the kind assistance of the 
Witkin publishers,32 I have reviewed the section that 
Clothesrigger referred to. The original 1985 hardback volume 
entry has nothing directly on point. It provides examples of 
situations in which judges must state their reasons, including 
those in which a statute requires it, such as a motion for a new 
trial, a motion for a nonsuit, and when a so-called statement of 
decision is mandated.33 Then Witkin notes non-statutory bases: 
28. See, e.g., Adam B. Badawi & Scott Baker, Appellate Lawmaking in a Judicial 
Hierarchy, 58 J.L. & ECON. 139, 141 (2015) (asserting that “the appellate court wants to 
set dicta at a level that optimizes the lower court’s use of those statements”); Judith M. 
Stinson, Why Dicta Becomes Holding and Why It Matters, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 219, 219 
(2010) (summarizing difficulties associated with differentiating holdings from dicta);
Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 956 n.4
(2005) (referring to “uncertainty” surrounding “holding-dicta line”). Sometimes what 
might have been thought of as a holding is set aside as dicta, Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and 
Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2012 (1994) (discussing holding in Marbury), and 
sometimes what is dicta is eagerly embraced as the foundation for a holding, Caroline 
Hatton, Comment, TILA: The Textualist-Intentionalist Litmus Act? 44 SETON HALL L.
REV. 207, 237–38 (2014) (considering Third and Ninth Circuits’ deferential approach to 
Supreme Court dicta); David Klein & Neal Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: Theory Versus 
Practice in Lower Court Decision Making, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2021, 2021 (2013) 
(pointing out that “lower courts hardly ever refuse to follow a statement from a higher 
court because it is dictum”).
29. B. E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE (5th ed. 2008).
30. B. E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW (10th ed. 2005).
31. Witkin has been celebrated as the “beloved giant in the California legal community.” 
Thomas E. Hollenhorst, Tentative Opinions: An Analysis of Their Benefit in the Appellate 
Court of California, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 n.1 (1995); see also In Memoriam Bernard E.
Witkin (1904–1995), CAL. SUP. CT. HISTORICAL SOC’Y (Dec. 3, 1996), http://www.cschs
.org/history/special-sessions/special-sessions-in-memoriam-bernard-e-witkin/ (collecting a
series of tributes by California Supreme Court justices and other state dignitaries).
32. My thanks to John K. Hanft of Thomson-Reuters for making a photocopy of the old 
text available.
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when a judge fails to rule on the merits,34 and similar 
situations35 in which the judge plainly misunderstood the rule,36
or was biased. In these cases relied on by Witkin, the trial court 
expressly got the law wrong or expressly refused to rule. That is
why the appellate court refused in each case to indulge the trial 
judge and refused to assume that he or she was right.
So the 1985 Witkin treatise sheds no light on the history 
that we seek. The cases it cites do not indicate that the Rule of 
Stated Reasons should be imported into the certification context. 
We don’t know why the Clothesrigger court cited the Witkin 
treatise. It’s a dead end.  But in another wonderful example of 
the eternally self-reflexive nature of legal citation, here is a 
second twist: The 1987 update to this section of the Witkin 
treatise relies, without comment, on—Clothesrigger.37
We might speculate about how the Rule of Stated Reasons
was quietly born in Clothesrigger. It is, after all, not too far a 
leap from (i) the Routine Rule38 that reviews substantial 
evidence and legal error, but assumes that the criteria are met, to 
(ii) a new rule which, unable to determine if the lower court was 
aware of the evidence or the law, declines to assume that the 
criteria are met. A court might invoke the Routine Rule that so 
“long as that [trial] court applies proper criteria and its action is 
founded on a rational basis, its ruling must be upheld,” but, 
finding no expression of correct reasons, reverse.39 Later, that 
reasoning might look like the application of the Rule of Stated 
Reasons.
34. The supporting citation is Gosnell v. Webb, 60 Cal. App. 2d 1, 5 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1943) (characterizing this as when “it appears that the trial court has declined to pass 
upon the merits of a motion”).
35. The supporting citation is Kyne v. Kyne, 60 Cal. App. 2d 326, 332 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1943) (suggesting that it would be so if court expressly refused to rule on the issues).
36. The supporting citation is Lippold v. Hart, 274 Cal. App. 2d 24, 26 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1969) (noting that court “misconceived” role at hearing and expressly used wrong 
test).
37. The citation to Clothesrigger was carried forward to the current edition, 9 B.E.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE ch. XII—Appeal, § 349(8) (5th ed. 2008).
38. Recall the Routine Rule: “A certification order generally will not be disturbed 
unless (1) it is unsupported by substantial evidence, (2) it rests on improper criteria, or (3) 
it rests on erroneous legal assumptions.” Fireside Bank, 40 Cal. 4th 1069 at 1089.
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Too, there is a price to pay under the Routine Rule. The 
court of appeal must review the entire record without direction 
from the trial judge. And because trial judges are fact finders in 
certification motions,40 the court of appeal may have to guess 
how the trial judge resolved conflicts in the evidence or weighed 
the evidence overall. But there is also this: Without some 
assurance that the trial judge has really thought about 
practicalities, the case might unfold into chaos and wasted years 
of litigation. It happens.41 This allusion to practicality may then 
be a hint to the deeper reasons for the Rule of Stated Reasons.
III. THE RATIONALE FOR THE RULE OF STATED REASONS
If direct history sheds no light, we might reach to kindred 
areas of law to learn the reason for the Rule. As the Witkin 
treatise notes, some statutes simply require a statement of 
reasons.42 Judges are required after a bench trial to provide a
statement of decision to support the judgment.43 California’s 
Code of Civil Procedure requires a statement of reasons for a 
new trial.44 (But the appellate remedy here is not, as it appears 
to be in the certification motion, to reverse and remand.45 Rather 
the courts of appeal shift from an abuse of discretion standard46
to a de novo review.47) Judges must make such a record when 
40. See infra note 61.
41. See, e.g., Duran v. U.S. Bank N.A., 59 Cal. 4th 1, 29 (Cal. 2014) (discussing 
importance of assessing—and reassessing—manageability of individual issues).
42. See text accompanying note 33, supra.
43. CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 632 (providing that on request the “court shall issue a 
statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its decision”); CAL. R. CT.
3.1590 (setting out procedures governing the preparation of a statement of decision).
44. CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 657 (providing that order granting motion for new trial “must 
state the ground or grounds relied upon by the court, and may contain the specification of 
reasons”).
45. See, e.g., Tellez, 240 Cal. App. 4th at 1062 (noting that any plausible reason will be 
sufficient to uphold order entered by court denying class certification, but court must state 
its reasons and reviewing court will review them for “correctness”).
46. E.g., Sprewell v. Jurjevic, Nos. A125569/A126272, 2011 WL 1260430, at *4 (Cal. 
Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2011) (“When the trial court grants a motion for new trial and 
provides a statement of reasons for its decision, the standard of review is abuse of 
discretion.”) (unpublished).
47. E.g., Oakland Raiders v. Nat’l Football League, 41 Cal. 4th 624, 628 (Cal. 2007)
(affirming result based on independent review by court of appeals); Montoya v. Barragan,





      05/10/2017   10:58:23
39109 aap_17-2 Sheet No. 29 Side A      05/10/2017   10:58:23
KARNOWRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/3/2017 1:32 AM
STANDARD OF REVIEW IN CLASS ACTIONS 227
they dismiss criminal charges.48 Federal courts are required to 
state their reasons when issuing preliminary injunctions,49 but 
not, it seems, state courts—at least in California.50 But 
California judges must issue orders explaining their reasons 
when deciding motions for summary judgment,51 and without 
that record the case can be reversed and remanded to get it.52 In 
the federal system, written findings are required when reviewing 
parole determinations53 and when departing from sentencing 
guidelines.54
48. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385(a) (providing that “reasons for the dismissal shall be 
stated orally on the record” and that the judge “shall also set forth the reasons in an order 
entered upon the minutes if requested by either party or in any case in which the 
proceedings are not being recorded electronically or reported by a court reporter”); see
also, e.g., People v. Ray, No. C035003, 2001 WL 1627987, at *3 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 
18, 2001) (“Notwithstanding the deferential standard of review, we must reverse and 
remand this matter to the trial court for two reasons. First, the court’s minute order does not 
include a reviewable statement of reasons for its decision.”) (unpublished).
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 65; see also, e.g., Digital Equip. Corp. v. Emulex Corp., 805 F.2d 
380, 382 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (acknowledging that Rule 65 requires a “statement of reasons”).
50. Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1450–51 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
2002) (indicating that the reviewing court’s responsibility is to “review [the] order, not the 
court’s reasons,” that a trial court is “not required to prepare a statement of decision or 
explain its reasoning,” and that the reviewing court will “presume the court considered 
every pertinent argument and resolved each one consistently with its minute order denying 
the preliminary injunction”); see also Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp, 214 Cal. 
App. 3d 831, 838 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (indicating that reviewing court indulges “all
reasonable inferences in support of the trial court’s order” (citation omitted)).
51. CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 437c(g) (providing that “[t]he court shall record its 
determination by court reporter or written order”).
52. E.g., Santa Barbara Pistachio Ranch v. Chowchilla Water Dist., 88 Cal. App. 4th 
439, 448–499 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (indicating that “failure to provide a sufficient 
statement of reasons is not automatic grounds for reversal,” but finding that failure in this 
case “was not harmless error”). There may be some disagreement about the consequences 
of a trial judge’s failure to issue the required order. Oddly, relying on this Santa Barbara
case that does reverse and remand, another case says there is no need to do so, perhaps 
because there was some explanation in the trial court. Hom v. Culinary Inst. of Am., No. 
A132499, 2012 WL 1107797, at *6 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2012) (indicating that 
appellate court reviews “the validity of the trial court’s ruling, not the reasons,” and that “a
deficient statement of reasons presents no harm when the validity of a summary judgment 
has been established”) (unpublished); see also Hasso v. Hasso, 148 Cal. App. 4th 329, 338 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (using de novo review and finding harmless error even with 
insufficient statement from trial judge).
53. E.g., Misasi v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 835 F.2d 754, 758 (10th Cir. 1987) (faulting 
stated reasons as “factually incorrect” and “non-specific”).
54. E.g., United States v. Salem, 597 F.3d 877, 888 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that 
although requirement may be satisfied in several ways, “a pro forma checking of a box on a 
preprinted form” is insufficient); United States v. Baham, 215 F. App’x 258, 261 (4th Cir. 
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In the context of this inquiry into the Rule of Stated 
Reasons, it is especially interesting that court review of an
administrative agency involves an evaluation of whether the 
agency has made a sufficient record—an “adequate statement of 
reasons.”55 With that statement of reasons, when the agency 
decision is plainly within the scope of the agency’s expertise, 
courts defer to that expertise:
In general . . . the inquiry is limited to whether the decision 
was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary 
support. . . . When making that inquiry, the “court must 
ensure that an agency has adequately considered all
relevant factors, and has demonstrated a rational connection 
between those factors, the choice made, and the purposes of 
the enabling statute.”56
Reviewing administrative determinations involves the same 
ordinary Routine Rule, applied when the aim of the review is to 
determine if there is substantial evidence and if the correct law 
was employed.57 Courts review for “legal error and substantial 
evidence.”58 In part, this is the result of the agencies’ role in fact 
court provides an inadequate statement of reasons”); cf. United States v. Bell, 371 F.3d 
239, 246 (5th Cir. 2004) (indicating that appellate court, unable to “resolve the uncertainty 
from the court’s written statement, . . . decline[d] to proceed without a clearer 
understanding of the district court’s reasons”).
55. E.g., Logan v. Principi, 71 F. App’x 836, 838 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (indicating that 
reviewing court is to determine, among other things, whether the conclusion below “is 
supported by an adequate statement of reasons or bases”); Donovan v. Local 6, Wash. 
Teachers’ Union, 747 F.2d 711, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting, in case under Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, that the required statement “should inform the 
court and the complaining union member of both the grounds of decision and the essential 
facts upon which the Secretary’s inferences are based”); see also ( Levi Family P’ship, L.P. 
v. City of L.A., 241 Cal. App. 4th 123, 131–32 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (indicating that 
agency must find facts “sufficient” to enable judicial review by “bridging the analytic gap 
between the raw evidence and ultimate decision or order” (citation omitted)).
56. Hi-Desert Med. Ctr. v. Douglas, 239 Cal. App. 4th 717, 730 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
2015) (quoting O.W.L. Found. v. City of Rohnert Park, 168 Cal. App. 4th 568, 585–86 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)).  But when the decision involves a “fundamental vested right”
appellate review is more stringent. PRACTICE GUIDE—CIVIL APPEALS, supra note 1, at
¶ 8:127a (referring to reviewing court’s examination of the record and exercise of 
independent judgment).
57. See text accompanying note 4, supra.
58. N. Cnty. Advocates v. City of Carlsbad, 241 Cal. App. 4th 94, 100 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2015) (citation omitted); see also, e.g., City of Hayward v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. St.
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finding;59 the substantial evidence test is premised on the 
inferior tribunal’s fact-finding powers.
Given the great deference provided to agencies, it is 
essential that the process and methods used by the agency are 
correct, for that likely ends up being the sole assurance of a 
legitimate determination. That is, the extent of deference 
correlates with the extent to which the agency’s process of 
determination is procedurally correct.  In some cases the 
harmless error standard is not applicable.60
So it is that in the context of administrative review we have 
a requirement of written reasons (as well as the routine rule of 
reversing when there is no substantial evidence, or the legal 
standards are mistaken). These are also the rules that apply when 
an appellate court reviews a trial judge’s certification order. In 
59. Atieh v. Riordan, 797 F.3d 135, 138 (1st Cir. 2015) (describing “narrow” standard 
of review that permits appellate court to “set aside an agency’s decision if it is ‘arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law,’ such as if 
it is ‘unsupported by substantial evidence’” (citation omitted)); Organized Vill. of Kake v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 795 F.3d 956, 966 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that “a policy change 
violates the APA ‘if the agency ignores or countermands its earlier factual findings without 
reasoned explanation for doing so’” (citation omitted)), cert. denied sub nom. Alaska v. 
Organized Vill. of Kake, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1509 (2016); Battelle Mem’l Inst. v. 
DiCecca, 792 F.3d 214, 221 (1st Cir. 2015) (determining that record included “substantial 
evidence that support[ed] . . . findings and ensuing conclusions”); Berkeley Hillside Pres. 
v. City of Berkeley, 60 Cal. 4th 1086, 1114 (Cal. 2015) (recognizing that “the agency 
serves as ‘the finder of fact’” (citation omitted)); Bowman v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 230
Cal. App. 4th 1146, 1150 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (noting that reviewing court’s “task 
involves ‘some weighing of the evidence’” (citation omitted)).
60. City of Hayward, 242 Cal. App. 4th at 839–40 (noting that review is “de novo” and 
that agency’s departure from procedures required by statutory scheme makes its decision 
“presumptively prejudicial”); San Lorenzo Valley Cmty. Advocates for Responsible Educ. 
v. San Lorenzo Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 139 Cal. App. 4th 1356, 1375 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2006) (indicating that questions of law—including those related to interpretation and 
application of statutory provisions—are reviewed de novo); State Water Res. Control Bd. 
Cases, 136 Cal. App. 4th 674, 723 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that harmless error 
standard is “not applicable”); but see Fort Mojave Indian Tribe v. Dep’t of Health Servs.,
38 Cal. App. 4th 1574, 1601 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (finding error in required 
distribution of information not prejudicial); compare N. Pacifica LLC v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 166 Cal. App. 4th 1416, 1434 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that to make 
out agency’s violation of open meeting laws, prejudice must be shown). Under the federal 
APA, procedural error that affects public comment and other inputs to the record may not 
be harmless. CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 9:29(3) (3d ed. Feb. 2017 update); see also Nina Golden & Carolyn Young, Harmful 
Error: How the Courts’ Failure to Apply the Harmless Error Doctrine Has Obstructed the 
ADA’s Standing Spectators Rule, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 35 (2008) 
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both situations, we have (i) an exceedingly important, usually 
decisive, order, and (ii) a very high level of deference, premised 
in part on (iii) the fact-finder role of the original forum (the 
agency or trial judge).61 Those factors go far in explaining the 
use of these rules of review.
Most of the other situations mapped out above in which a
statement of reasons is required also involve decisive moments 
in the case. Most obviously, summary judgment motions and the 
statement of decision required to support the ultimate 
determination in a case are of such import; so too is the decision 
to dismiss a criminal case. And there is considerable discretion
involved in dismissing charges and sentencing (although not 
usually in the summary judgment context), and a very high level 
of discretion in deciding cases as a fact finder that results in a 
statement of decision. Both these factors—a decisive point and a
high level of discretion—are present in certification motions.
As every lawyer who handles class actions knows, the 
certification motion is the decisive moment in a case. Very few 
of these cases actually go to trial: The moment of truth is the 
certification motion. Indeed, if the case is not certified, the 
“death knell” doctrine recognizes that it is in effect dead, and an 
immediate appeal may be taken.62 For everyone but the class 
representative, the case is actually over if the class is not 
certified; for them, the order really is dispositive.63
61. Trial judges are fact finders in certification motions and can weigh (and even 
disbelieve) evidence as they wish. For example, they may give little weight to boilerplate 
“identical and undetailed declarations,” Mora v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 194 Cal. App. 4th 
496, 508 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), and more weight to declarations with specific and
individualized detail, id. at 509–10. See generally Mies v. Sephora U.S.A., Inc., 234 Cal. 
App. 4th 967, 981 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (noting great discretion accorded trial judge);
Dailey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 214 Cal. App. 4th 974, 991 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)
(noting that trial judge “is permitted to credit one party’s evidence over the other’s”); In re 
Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006) (indicating that trial judge 
is allowed considerable discretion), clarified on denial of reh’g, 483 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007)
(declining to revise initial decision); Sav-on Drug Stores, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 34 Cal. 4th 
319, 333–34 (Cal. 2004) (referring to trial court’s discretion in evaluating both 
“boilerplate” and “detailed, fact-specific” evidence).
62. See generally Curtis Karnow, Complexity in Litigation: A Differential Diagnosis, 18 
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1, 27 (2015).
63. In re Baycol Cases I & II., 51 Cal. 4th 751, 760, 248 P.3d 681, 686 (Cal. 2011) 
(noting that “the action has in fact and law come to an end, as far as the members of the 
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It is also true that the deference accorded to trial judges
making certification decisions is very high—at least, so read the 
opinions.64 What is interesting here is the reason for the 
deference. It has to do with the practicalities of the situation, 
factors that only the trial judge is in a position to explore. It is 
the trial judge who will have to handle the trial, who must 
manage the case, who can determine the feasibility of trying the 
case as a class action, with or without bifurcation, use of 
subclasses, severance of certain issues, phasing, perhaps 
extracting issues for class treatment,65 or the use of referees or 
special masters for damages calculation; and so on. Just as an 
administrative agency has a scope of expertise quite different 
from that of judges, so too trial judges have a presumed 
expertise on case and trial management that ought to be allowed 
as free a rein as possible: “Because trial courts are ideally 
situated to evaluate the efficiencies and practicalities of 
permitting group action, they are afforded great discretion in 
granting or denying certification.”66 Just as the Rule of Stated 
Reasons allows the reviewing court to observe that the agency’s 
substantial discretion has been exercised, so too in the 
certification context the reviewing court wants assurance that the 
trial judge’s enormous discretion has been exercised. In both 
cases the reviewing court is in a very poor position to decide 
whether the result is correct; it can only guard the process. And 
or she may forever lose the right to do so. Munoz v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 238 Cal. 
App. 4th 291, 308 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
64. E.g., Brinker, 53 Cal. 4th at 1022 (characterizing review on appeal as “narrowly 
circumscribed” and referring to “great deference” standard articulated in Fireside Bank).
65. For the federal provision, see Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(4). See
generally Joseph A. Seiner, The Issue Class, 56 B.C. L. REV. 121, 132 (2015) (discussing 
“‘issue-class’ certification”). California allows certification of “particular issues,” CAL. R.
CT. 3.765(b), although efforts at this kind of certification are very rare. See, e.g., Downing 
v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 2010 WL 4233033, at *5 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2010)
(involving proposed “liability only” class) (unpublished); Evans v. Lasco Bathware, Inc.,
178 Cal. App. 4th 1417, 1434–35 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (same).
66. Hale v. Sharp Healthcare, 232 Cal. App. 4th 50, 57 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)
(quoting Sav-on Drug, 34 Cal. 4th at 326); see also Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Super. Ct.,
29 Cal. 4th 1096, 1132 (Cal. 2003) (Moreno, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting 
Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 828 (10th Cir. 1995): “A trial court’s class 
certification determination is discretionary because ‘it is “a practical problem, and 
primarily a factual one with which a [trial] court generally has a greater familiarity and 
expertise than does a court of appeal.”’”); Tellez, 240 Cal. App. 4th at 1062 (quoting 
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so it is that the process, the method, the procedures, are the 
focus when certification orders are reviewed.67 That review is 
impossible absent the Rule of Stated Reasons. This standard is 
not, despite some language to the contrary,68 in derogation of the 
trial judge’s broad discretion; it is a concomitant.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
This look at the standard of review and its rationale has 
consequences for trial judges and the lawyers who brief 
certification motions before them. The implication is a focus on 
manageability—the practical stuff.  Of course there are other 
factors that must be considered when evaluating a certification 
motion, such as numerosity, adequate representation by the 
plaintiff as well as by counsel, typicality, common questions, 
and so on,69 but generally these factors—perhaps aside from 
common questions—usually are not hotly contested; more 
importantly the court of appeal can figure most of these out just 
as well as a trial judge.  The difficult issues have to do with the 
superiority of the class action over individual cases, the very 
closely related issue of the extent to which common issues 
predominate over individual ones, and so the general issue of 
manageability, which embraces those matters.
In Duran, the California Supreme Court directed a very 
careful look at the manageability issues.70 The call has been 
repeated in other cases, with instructions to look to “efficient 
67. E.g., PRACTICE GUIDE—CIVIL APPEALS, supra note 1, at ¶ 8:225 (quoting multiple 
cases on the “criteria” and “analysis” and “reasons” and “process”). See this language from 
the primogenitor, Clothesrigger: “Our focus on correct process requires us to reverse even 
though there may be substantial evidence to support the court’s order.” 191 Cal. App. 3d at
612 (emphasis supplied).
68. Knapp, 195 Cal. App. 4th at 939 (“Despite this grant of discretion” Rule of Stated 
Reasons imposed (emphasis supplied)); Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A. v. Super. Ct., 24 Cal. 4th 
906, 914 (Cal. 2001) (noting that courts are “afforded great discretion” but “nonetheless”
imposing Rule of Stated Reasons (emphasis supplied)); Tellez, 240 Cal. App. 4th at 1062
(noting review “[d]espite the great discretion” afforded trial courts (emphasis supplied)). 
69. See generally ROBERT I. WEIL ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: CIVIL 
PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL ch. 14 (2015) (discussing class actions) [hereinafter PRACTICE 
GUIDE—BEFORE TRIAL].
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and effective means” of resolving the underlying disputes.71 The 
point in certification motions is not, exactly, whether there are 
common issues; it is whether the balance of common and 
individual issues makes the case manageable.72 Individual issues 
are fine—as long as they can be managed.73 This is the import 
of the predominance and superiority factors.74
Of course, this sort of practical evaluation is not done by 
comparing the raw number of common and individual issues. It 
is not an abstract weighing of “important” or “significant” issues 
(common or not) against issues that in some vague way are less 
important. Instead, the showing often will take the form of a trial 
plan—a practical outline of the number and types of witnesses
likely to be testifying, matched to the elements of the claims and 
of the significant affirmative defenses.75 If statistics will be 
used, the plan will demonstrate that the analysis can actually be 
accomplished, perhaps by way of a pilot study.76 Presumably 
both sides contribute to the plan, plaintiffs in an effort to show 
how the class trial can be managed, and defendants hoping to 
demonstrate that it cannot.77 If the class is certified, and later it 
appears the trial will not in fact be manageable, the court 
decertifies the class.78
The trial plan is the parties’ forum for discussing the utility 
of the procedures noted above such as phasing, bifurcation, issue 
certification, and the rest,79 together with various means to 
expedite (and so manage) trial, such as the use of summaries of 
71. Martinez v. Joe’s Crab Shack Holdings, 231 Cal. App. 4th 362, 384 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2014).
72. Alberts v. Aurora Behavioral Health Care, 241 Cal. App. 4th 388, 394 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2015) (noting that “the parties and the trial court focused almost exclusively on 
the existence of common issues, to the exclusion of the issue of manageability,” and 
“[a]ccordingly, . . . revers[ing] and remand[ing]”).
73. E.g., Morgan v. Wet Seal, Inc., 210 Cal. App. 4th 1341, 1369 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
2012); Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 533 (quoting Brinker, 53 Cal. 4th at 1024); Mies, 234 Cal. 
App. 4th at 980.
74. Hale, 232 Cal. App. 4th at 65 n.3.
75. Duran spends considerable time speaking to trial plans, 59 Cal. 4th at 15–16, 31–
48, and this is invoked in Martinez, 231 Cal. App. 4th at 384; see also Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 
533 (quoting Brinker, 53 Cal. 4th at 1024); NEWBERG, supra note 3, at ch. 11 (addressing 
trials and trial methods in “aggregate litigation” and jury instructions in class actions).
76. Duran, 59 Cal. 4th at 22, 42.
77. E.g., id. at 56 (Liu, J., concurring).
78. Sav-on Drug, 34 Cal. 4th at 335.
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voluminous documents, statistics,80 stipulations, bench trials,81 a
focus (if appropriate) on aggregate and not individual 
damages,82 summaries of noncontroversial depositions,83 and so 
on.  It is not enough to list these procedures; the trial plan must 
actually explain how in the specific context of the case they will 
solve a specific manageability problem.84
The parties and the trial judge may be handicapped in this, 
because the trial plan is proposed early in the life of the case: 
Certification is to be sought “as soon as practicable.”85 The
timing of the motion is very much within the discretion of the 
trial court, so the judge, informed by the parties, should allow 
time for discovery sufficient to develop the trial plan. In the end, 
the parties should propose “innovative procedures”86 and help 
the judge exercise his or her very broad discretion to determine 
whether trial is feasible, and so enable the judge to issue an 
80. Compare Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, ___U.S.___, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016)
(allowing use of statistics associated with a representative sample because employer had 
failed to maintain proper records that might otherwise have provided evidence of actual 
time each employee spent donning and doffing protective gear), with Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (disapproving use of sociological testimony about corporate 
culture and likelihood that supervisors relied on gender stereotypes because expert could 
not testify whether any portion of employees in putative class had been passed over for 
promotion because supervisors relied on gender stereotypes).
81. Karnow, supra note 62, at 59–63.
82. Bruno v. Super. Ct., 127 Cal. App. 3d 120, 129 n.4 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(explicitly approving use of aggregate calculations in lieu of “summing individual 
claims”); see also Evans, 178 Cal. App. 4th at 1430 (pointing out that “although a trial 
court has discretion to permit a class action to proceed where the damages recoverable by 
the class must necessarily be based on estimations, the trial court equally has discretion to 
deny certification when it concludes the fact and extent of each member’s injury requires 
individualized inquiries that defeat predominance” (emphasis in original)); Bell v. Farmers 
Ins. Exch., 115 Cal. App. 4th 715, 758 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (indicating that 
“economist and statistician” was properly allowed to testify as expert in connection with 
employer’s statistical evidence, but also noting that expert’s testimony as to psychological 
phenomenon outside his area of expertise was properly excluded).
83. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION §§ 11.64, 12:332 (2016).
84. Dunbar v. Albertson’s, Inc., 141 Cal. App. 4th 1422, 1432 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
2006) (pointing out that “the party seeking class certification must explain how the 
procedure will effectively manage the issues in question”).
85. PRACTICE GUIDE—BEFORE TRIAL, supra note 69, at ¶ 14:98 (emphasis in original);
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1785.3 (3d ed. 2016 
update) (indicating that “[b]oth under the prior language of the rule and the current 
language, the general notion is that, when feasible, the certification decision should be 
made promptly”).
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APPENDIX
I. THE RULE OF STATED REASONS: A GENEALOGY
These tables trace the development of the Rule of Stated 
Reasons. A zero after a case name means that the Rule of Stated 
Reasons is not discussed in the case, as “Occidental 1986-0,” a
dead end. Some such cases discuss nothing like the Rule of 
Stated Reasons; others discuss another rule, such as the Rule of 
Intendments. The significant lines of descent center on Linder,
which focuses on Clothesrigger. To aid readability, only names 
and years appear in the tables. Full citations follow in Part III.
Table 1
The Mies Line
Mies 2015, which relies on
Knapp 2011, which relies on
                    Linder 2000, which relies on
                             Bartold 2000, which relies on
                                       Clothesrigger 1987, which relies on 
                                                     WITKIN, supra note 37
                                                     Richmond 1981-0 (dead end), which relies on
                                                                Fletcher 1979-0 (dead end)
                                                        Occidental 1986-0 (dead end)
                                        National Solar 1991, which relies on
                                                     Clothesrigger 1987
                                                     Richmond 1981-0 (dead end)
                                        Daniels 1993, which relies on
                                                     Clothesrigger 1987
                                                     National Solar 1991
                    Sav-On 2004, which relies on
                              Linder 2000
                              Lockheed 2003-0, which relies on
                                        Linder 2000 
                                        Richmond 1981-0 (dead end)
                    Bufil 2008, which relies on
                              Linder 2000
                              Quacchia 2004, which relies on
                                        Linder 2000
                                        Corbett 2002, which relies on
                                                     Linder 2000
                                                  Bartold 2000
                                        Washington Mutual 2001, which relies on
                                                     Linder 2000
                              Capital People 2007, which relies on
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Timeout for Linder, a significant ancestor case. It is 
directly relied on by Knapp, Bufil, Capital People, Quacchia,
Sav-On, Lockheed, Corbett, Washington Mutual, and other cases
that are outside the lines of descent included in this genealogy.
Table 2
The Hataishi Branch
Hataishi 2014, which relies on
Linder 2000
Kaldenbach 2009, which relies on
                      Bartold 2000, which relies on
                               Clothesrigger 1987, which relies on
                                         WITKIN, supra note 37
                                         Richmond 1981-0 (dead end), which relies on
                                                  Fletcher 1979-0 (dead end)
                                                  Occidental 1986-0 (dead end)
                               National Solar 1991, which relies on
                              Clothesrigger 1987
                                         Richmond 1981-0 (dead end)
                               Daniels 1993, which relies on 
                                        Clothesrigger 1987
                                National Solar 1991
Caro 1993, which relies on
                               Petherbridge 1974-0, which relies on
                               Gold Strike 1970-0, which relies on
                                                  City of New York 1969-0 (dead end)
                               Interpace 1971-0 (dead end), which relies on
                                                  Platt 1964-0 (dead end)
                            National Solar 1991
                              Daniels 1993
Timeout for Clothesrigger, another significant ancestor. It 
is relied on directly by Bartold, National Solar, Daniels, Caro,
and other cases. Through Bartold, Clothesrigger is the key case 
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II. TRIBUTARIES
Each recent citing case joins either the Mies Line or the 
Hataishi Branch or terminates in a dead end: Jaimez relies on 
Linder and Ramirez (which relies on Kaldenbach, Bartold,
Linder, and Caro). Weinstat relies on Bartold, Linder, and 
Capitol People. Ayala and Brinker rely on Linder. Dynamex is a 
dead end.
Table 3
Other Recent Citations to Ancestor Cases
Citing Case Cited Case or Cases
Benton 2013 Jaimez 2010
Jones 2013 Linder 2000, Weinstat 2010
Thompson 2013 Linder 2000, Kaldenbach 2009, Sav-On 2004
Williams 2013 Weinstat 2010, Ramirez 2013, Jaimez 2010, Bufil 2008
Cochran 2014 Knapp 2011
Hale 2014 Thompson 2013, Ayala 2014
Hendershot 2014 Corbett 2002, Clothesrigger 1987, Brinker 2012
Kight 2014 Williams 2013
Martinez 2014 Ayala 2014, Benton 2013, Dynamex 2014-0
Aguirre 2015 Linder 2000
Alberts 2015 Bartold 2000, Bufil 2008, Jaimez 2010
Cruz 2015 Thompson 2013
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III. RELEVANT CASES
Case Citations—Reverse Chronological Order
Mies v. Sephora U.S.A., Inc., 234 Cal. App. 4th 967, 981
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Knapp)
Cruz v. Sun World Int’l, LLC, 243 Cal. App. 4th 367, 373
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Brinker)
Alberts v. Aurora Behavioral Health Care, 241 Cal. App. 4th 388, 399
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Brinker and Linder)
Tellez v. Rich Voss Trucking, Inc., 240 Cal. App. 4th 1052, 1062
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App 2015) (citing Knapp and Linder)
Aguirre v. Amscan Holdings, Inc., 234 Cal. App. 4th 1290, 1299
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Linder)
Martinez v. Joe’s Crab Shack Holdings, 231 Cal. App. 4th 362, 373
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Ayala, Benton, and Dynamex)
Hataishi v. First Am. Home Buyers Protection Corp., 223 Cal. App. 4th 1454, 1462
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Linder and Kaldenbach)
Hale v. Sharp Healthcare, 232 Cal. App. 4th 50, 58
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Ayala)
Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 522, 530
(Cal. 2014) (citing Brinker and Linder)
Cochran v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 228 Cal. App. 4th 1137, 1143
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Case Citations—Reverse Chronological Order (continued)
Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 230 Cal. App. 4th 718, 725
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Ayala), review granted and opinion superseded
sub nom. Dynamex Operations W. v. S.C. (Lee), 341 P.3d 438 (Cal. 2015)
Kight v. CashCall, Inc., 231 Cal. App. 4th 112, 126
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Williams)
Hendershot v. Ready to Roll Transp., Inc., 228 Cal. App. 4th 1213, 1221
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Knapp, Brinker, Corbett, and Clothesrigger)
Williams v. Super. Ct., 221 Cal. App. 4th 1353, 1361
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Linder, Weinstat, and WITKIN, supra note 37)
Jones v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 221 Cal. App. 4th 986, 995
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Sav-On and Fireside Bank)
Benton v. Telecom Network Specialists, Inc., 220 Cal. App. 4th 701, 716
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Jaimez)
Thompson v. Auto. Club of S. Cal., 217 Cal. App. 4th 719, 726
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Linder and Kaldenbach)
Ramirez v. Balboa Thrift and Loan, 215 Cal. App. 4th 765, 776
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Kaldenbach, Bartold, and Caro)
Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Super. Ct., 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1022 (Cal. 2012)
(citing Fireside Bank and Hamwi)
Knapp v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 195 Cal. App. 4th 932, 939
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Case Citations—Reverse Chronological Order (continued)
Weinstat v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 180 Cal. App. 4th 1213, 1223–24
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Bartold, Linder, and Capitol People)
Jaimez v. DAIOHS USA, Inc., 181 Cal. App. 4th 1286, 1297–1298
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Linder, Sav-On, Bartold, and Bufil)
Kaldenbach v. Mut. of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 178 Cal. App. 4th 830, 843
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Bartold and Caro)
Bufil v. Dollar Fin. Group, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 4th 1193, 1204–05
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Linder, Capitol People, and Quacchia)
Capitol People First v. Dep’t of Dev. Servs., 155 Cal. App. 4th 676, 689
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Linder)
Quacchia v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 122 Cal. App. 4th 1442, 1447
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Linder, Washington Mutual, and Corbett)
Sav-on Drug Stores, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 34 Cal. 4th 319, 326–27 (Cal. 2004)
(citing Linder and Lockheed)
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Super. Ct., 29 Cal. 4th 1096, 1106 (Cal. 2003)
(citing Linder, Washington Mutual, and Richmond)
Corbett v. Super. Ct., 101 Cal. App. 4th 649, 658
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Linder and Bartold)
Washington Mut. Bank, FA v. Super. Ct., 24 Cal. 4th 906, 914 (Cal. 2001)
(citing Linder)
Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co., 23 Cal. 4th 429, 435 (Cal. 2000)
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Case Citations—Reverse Chronological Order (continued)
Bartold v. Glendale Fed. Bank, 81 Cal. App. 4th 816, 828–29
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (citing National Solar, Daniels, and Clothesrigger),
superseded by legis. action, 2001 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 560
Caro v. Procter & Gamble Co., 18 Cal. App. 4th 644, 655
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (citing National Solar, Clothesrigger, and Petherbridge)
Daniels v. Centennial Grp., Inc., 16 Cal. App. 4th 467, 474
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (citing National Solar, Clothesrigger, and Richmond)
Nat’l Solar Equip. Owners’ Assn. v. Grumman Corp., 235 Cal. App. 3d 1273, 1281
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (citing Richmond and Clothesrigger)
Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp., 191 Cal. App. 3d 605, 611
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Witkin)
Rosack v. Volvo of Am. Corp., 131 Cal. App. 3d 741, 750
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (citing Occidental Land, Hamwi, and Witkin)
Grogan-Beall v. Ferdinand Roten Galleries, Inc., 133 Cal. App. 3d 969, 975
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (citing Occidental Land, Altman, and Hamwi)
Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc., 29 Cal. 3d 462, 470 (Cal. 1981)
(citing Occidental Land and Fletcher)
Fletcher v. Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 23 Cal. 3d 442, 446 (Cal. 1979)
(citing no authority)
Altman v. Manhattan Sav. Bank, 83 Cal. App. 3d 761, 765–66
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Case Citations—Reverse Chronological Order (continued)
Hamwi v. Citinational-Buckeye Inv. Co., 72 Cal. App. 3d 462, 472
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (citing Occidental Land)
Occidental Land, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 18 Cal. 3d 355, 361 (Cal. 1976)
(citing Petherbridge)
Petherbridge v. Altadena Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 37 Cal. App. 3d 193, 199–200
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (citing Interpace and Gold Strike)
Interpace Corp. v. City of Phila., 438 F.2d 401, 403 (3d Cir. 1971)
(citing Platt)
Gold Strike Stamp Co. v. Christensen, 436 F.2d 791, 792–93 (10th Cir. 1970)
(citing International Pipe)
City of N.Y. v. Int’l Pipe and Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295, 298 (2d Cir. 1969)
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23)
Platt v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240, 245 (1964)
